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 “Moves in an extensive form game constitute a 
language, and a move sequence represents a conversation” 
 
(McCabe et al., 2000:4407) 
 
“[In economics] we are only concerned with the 
‘what’ and the ‘how’, and not at all with the ‘why’”    
 
(Wicksteed, 1933[1910]:165). 
 
 
1 Introduction 
 
 Philosophy of action and modern neurosciences agree with the fact that as social 
actors, but most importantly as human beings, we invariably perceive other agents’ 
behaviour as directed at certain targets. We operate in our social environments as 
“intentionality-detectors” (Metzinger & Gallese, 2003). Economic theory, however, tends 
to sterilize the impact of others’ behaviour and their intentions by focussing on market 
behaviour where the direct impact of behavioral interdependence is minimised. Two 
important exceptions to this neoclassical approach are the so-called new social economics1 
and game theory.   
 In the early ‘40s the theory of games originally developed out of the dissatisfaction 
for the limitations of neoclassical theorizing about social interdependency and agents’ 
intertwinedness. Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) pointed out that most of the 
social situations in the economic domain are characterised, literally and not only 
metaphorically, by the same structure of a game. The most important ability to play a 
game is that of accurately predicting other players’ behaviour. Consequently this ability 
should be at the core of any theory of strategic interactions, such as game theory aims to 
be. However, it is surprising and even disappointing to realise retrospectively that classical 
game, theory after 50 years of development, still basically assumes instead of explaining that 
agents are capable to predict others’ behaviour.  
 A promising step forward to fill this gap is constituted by Psychological Game 
Theory (PGT) (Geneakoplos, Pearce & Stacchetti, 1989; Battigalli & Dufwemberg, 2005), 
which develops analytical tools to formalise this kind of social abilities. This is done, on 
the one hand, by letting players’ payoffs depend not only on players’ actions, as it is in the 
classical theory, but also on players’ intentions, beliefs and emotions, and on the other, by 
providing solution concepts that take into account this complex causality.  
                                                 
1  In this paper, I will not consider the former approach. See Glaeser, Sacerdote & Scheinkman 
(1996, 2003); Glaeser & Scheinkman (2001, 2003), Gui & Sugden, (2005), and Scheinkman 
(forthcoming) for a review.  
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 The main thesis of the paper is that, thanks to the epistemic features of these 
analytical tools, PGT is well suited to address and, to some extent solve, three of the 
most challenging problems emerged in the domain of the classical theory in the latest 
years: the first issue, perhaps the least explored of the three, refers to the problem of 
players’ intentionality, the second, to the problem of trust and to that related of 
payoff’s endogenisation, and the third to the so-called framing effect. 
 The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: section 2 discusses the concepts 
of “other” and “otherness” as conceived by classical game theory, in a historical-
methodological perspective. Section 3 introduces the problem of intentionality by 
presenting a few experimental results that challenge the assumption of consequentialism. 
Section 4 outlines the very basic features of PGT linking this evidence to the problem of 
intentionality in philosophy and neurosciences and discusses the way PGT formalises the 
mind-reading process. Sections 5 focuses on the problem of trust and payoff 
endogenisation. Section 6 analyses the effects of decision frames for strategic decision-
making and how PGT can take these effects into account. Section 7 ends the paper with 
some closing remarks 
 
 
2 Game Theory, the others and their “otherness”.  
 
 Before addressing the three issues mentioned above, intentions, trust and frames, 
let me briefly depict the background where they are situated. The background here 
refers to the way classical game theory tackles the social dimension of interpersonal 
relationships; how, in particular, it describes and models the role of others and of their 
“otherness” in strategic interactions. At the end, a picture will emerge of a theory that 
tries rather to elude the “otherness” of social agents, and its consequent implications, 
than to understand it.   
 Consider first Von Neumann-Morgenstern’s game theory: although the concept 
of interdependence lies at the core of their theory, the idea of interactive rational 
behaviour, as embodied in the minimax criterion, derives directly from their idea of 
individual rational behaviour. In other words, it seems as if it were defined 
independently of other players’ behaviour. A given course of action, in fact, is viewed 
as rational, if it maximises the minimum payoff one can get whatever the other players 
do. This independence from others’ decisions can be read as a consequence of Von 
Neumann-Morgenstern’s desire to expunge any reference to the psychological 
dimension of the agents from their theory. Von Neumann’s 1928 original project is 
coherently embedded in this historical line, and its heritage strongly oriented his joint 
work with Morgenstern towards a particular characterisation of rational behaviour 
“capable of setting the players free from the necessity to form an expectation about 
the rivals’ actions and thoughts” (Giocoli, 2003:282), and of social interactions where 
all the details are expunged except for the mathematical properties of the payoffs.  
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 Describing Von Neumann-Morgenstern’s formal world, Thomas Schelling points 
out two main weaknesses: 
i) interdependence reduced to independence: a player “does not need to 
communicate with his opponent, he does not even need to know who the 
opponent is or whether there is one. (...) with a minimax criterion, a zero-sum 
game is reduced to a completely unilateral affair” (1960:105, emphasis 
added).  
ii) De-psychologization of the prediction process of others’ behvaior: “A 
randomised strategy is a deliberate means of destroying any possibility of 
communication, especially communication of intentions” (Ivi). 
  
 In the next and somewhat alternative step in the elaboration of a complete theory 
of games, John Nash (1950, 1951) develops a solution concept that embodies a rather 
different consideration of others’ role in determining one’s own optimal strategies. A 
set of strategies leads to a Nash equilibrium when they represent optimal replies to 
what the player assumes other players would do. Therefore, when choosing a certain 
action, each player must have in mind which action the other players are going to 
choose. Each player forms conjectures about other players’ behaviour and they also 
know that the other players form similar conjectures as well. Notice, however, that 
these conjectures are always inspired by the assumption that all the players will act to 
maximize their payoff. The convergence to the equilibrium point, which must satisfy 
the requirement of conjectures’ (or beliefs’) mutual consistency, is in the end assured 
by the two assumptions of optimising behaviour and common knowledge of 
optimising conduct. Thus, in Nash’s theory agents’ intentions are assumed to be 
limited to the goal of payoffs maximisations. To appreciate the restrictiveness of these 
assumptions, one may note, for example, that the theory implies the coordination of 
expectations, that is, that two players’ beliefs about how a third player would play the 
game must necessarily be the same.  
 Players form unmodifiable strategies before the game begins and cannot engage in 
counterfactual reasoning, which would be needed to answer questions like: “what 
would I do if you did not conform to my assumption of optimising behaviour?”. In 
this case the only thing to do is to assume that the other is behaving irrationally and 
thus suspending the game. That conclusion has being interpreted as an implication of 
the distinctive solipsistic nature of Nash’s theory: “Our theory (...) is based on the 
absence of coalitions in that it is assumed each participants act independently, without 
collaboration or communication with any of the others” (Nash, 1996:22). 
Commenting on this point Philip Mirowski emphasises that: “what would mean to 
play a game without any open acknowledgment of an opponent whatsoever did seem 
to be a paradox; unless of course, the opponent was a machine” (2002:342). 
 Bayesian game theory has taken only a slightly different attitude. It provides a 
framework to analyse games of incomplete information, in which there is uncertainty, 
for instance, towards players’ incentives or towards the history of the play. In a 
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Bayesian game each agent’s private information is conceptualized assuming the 
existence of different players’ type that, as well as the structure of the game, are 
assumed to be common knowledge (Harsanyi, 1967-68). Players form and revise beliefs 
about which type is matched with. These beliefs can be considered as conjectures 
about players’ types or players’ incentives and not about their motives. Let’s consider a 
game in which A and B do not know each other’s payoff functions – suppose, for 
simplicity, that they do know their own payoff functions. This game can be modelled at 
least in two different ways. First: player A knows that player B’s strategy will depend 
on player A’s own payoff function. Thus, before choosing her move, A will form 
some expectation about B’s payoff. At the same time, B will form some expectation about 
A’s payoff function. Once these first-order expectations are established, A will form 
some second-order expectations about B’s first-order expectations, whereas B will 
form some second-order expectations about A’s first-order expectations, and so on. 
Notice that in the Bayesian approach these expectations are nothing but subjective 
probability distributions over the relevant mathematical objects. Of course, any model 
based on higher and higher order expectations would be much more complicated in 
the case of n-person games (with n> 2). In the “Harsany framework”, according to the 
words of its own champion, this way of model players’ behaviour would be - “very 
natural - yet (...) rather impractical” (Harsany, 1994:137). Besides, the use of subjective 
probability distributions of various orders poses many technical difficulties. Although 
these difficulties can be somewhat overcome (Aumann, 1963, 1964), the above 
procedure to model higher and higher-order subjective probability distributions 
remains, in Harsany’s view – “a hopelessly cumbersome model for analysis of 
[incomplete information] games” (1994:150).  
 The second way to model incomplete information games is to transform them 
into imperfect information games by letting an external random device (Nature) 
determine the type of players (the active players) that are actually interacting in a given 
game. Each player tries to estimate the probability associated to each Nature’s move 
which, in turn, depends on what Harsany calls “the relevant social forces”. They will, 
in fact, try to estimate these probabilities as an outside observer would do, one restricted 
to information common to both players (cf. Harsanyi, 1967–68:176). Besides, each 
player knows that the other players will estimate these probabilities in the same way as 
they do (see Fudenberg & Tirole, 1991:210). An alternative interpretation of this 
common prior assumption considers players behaving as if both of them know the true 
numerical values of these probabilities. Thus, in Bayesian games each outcome is 
associated with a unique plan, a unique strategy, a unique set of intentions and, most 
importantly, a unique and common prior distribution of beliefs over types, beliefs that are 
common and imported from outside the game.  
 In Bayesian game theory a game of incomplete information that can be used to 
describe players’ heterogeneity with regard to the set of conceivable intentions 
underlying each moves, can be modelled either in a natural but, to say at best, 
impractical way, or in a practical yet very unintuitive and unrealistic way. In particular, 
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such unrealism constitutes a serious limitation whenever we want to describe and 
analyse all those many social situations in which people’s motivations may be affected 
by emotional factors (i.e. belief-dependent emotions) such as, inter alia, “anger, hatred, 
guilt, shame, pride, admiration, regret, rejoicing, disappointment, elation, fear, hope, 
joy, envy, malice, indignation, jealousy, surprise, boredom, sexual desire, enjoyment, 
worry and frustration” (Battigalli & Dufwemberg, 2005:41), that may be best modeled 
by considering internal or endogenous beliefs. 
 In the end, one may be justified in suspecting that classical game theory possesses 
either a far too simplistic or a far too complicated model of players' “otherness”, in 
particular with regard to the important aspect of intentionality. This neglect 
determines most of game theory’s problems in the explanation and prediction of real 
people’s behavior. In this area or research game theorists may benefit from 
contributions coming from different fields such as philosophy of action and 
neurosciences2. 
  
 
3 Evidence of non-consequentialist behaviour.  
  
 In classical game theory players are exclusively motivated by what is in the payoff. 
This is basically what the assumption of consequentialism prescribes. Players order 
their preferences over actions according to their preferences over the consequences 
these actions lead to. If action a produces outcome α, action b produces outcome β 
and action c yields to outcome γ; action a is preferred to b and  to c, as long as 
outcome α is preferred to β and the latter to γ. Robust experimental evidence, 
however, shows that, contrary to the consequentialist postulate, the same outcome 
may be variously assessed depending on the history of the moves that lead to it. That 
means that when deciding on how to behave in a strategic situation, real people take 
into account not only the prospective outcomes of their joint actions, but also other 
backward-looking factors, such as by-gones and counterfactual arguments.  
 Consider the games G1 and G2. Player A makes an offer to B of either $2 (L) or 
$5 (H) in G1, or $2 (L) or $8 (H) in G2, player B can either accept (A) or reject (R) 
A’s offer. If she accepts, the division is implemented and the players are paid 
accordingly. If she refuses to accept, both players get nothing.  
Assumed that players are risk-averse and that they are self-interested and 
consequentialist rational maximizers, game theory produces two testable predictions: 
i) As would offer the smallest amount of money, and consequently, B 
would not reject any positive offer.  
                                                 
2 Efforts in this direction are attested by the work of Bacharach (1999), Singer & Fehr (2005), 
Ross (2005), Pugno (2005) and Camerer et al. (forthcoming) 
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ii) Given that the outcomes conditional to As choosing "H" are identical in 
G1 and G2, we should observe the same in both situations, or a very 
similar rate of refusal. 
  
G1: Reduced Ultimatum Game 
        
         Player A 
 
         H          L 
      
  
                Player B          Player B 
  
             
            A               R      A      R  
                
        8   0   5         0 
   2   0   5         0  
 
G2: Reduced Best-Shot Game 
 
        Player A 
 
        H          L 
      
  
              Player B           Player B 
  
             
           A             R      A              R   
             
         8           0   2                 0 
  2           0   8        0 
    
 However, when real people play the games we observe, first, that Bs 
reject  As’ offers more often than it would have been "rational"; second, 
and more interestingly, that the number of refusals is higher in G1 (44%) 
than in G2 (18%). That result is surprising because, once A proposes 2 
to B, the two games are identical from B’s perspective, at least in terms 
of outcomes, payoff distribution and consequences (Falk et al., 2003). 
This finding seems to contradict both predictions. Similar results are 
reported in Pelligra (2004), where respondents’ behaviour in a 
“gratuitous investment game” is compared to the proposers’ in a 
“dictator game”.  The data show that, although from the respondents’ 
viewpoint (in the investment game) and from the proposers’ viewpoint 
(in the dictator game) the two games are identical, in terms of the 
consequences they lead to, in the investment game the respondents send 
back on average 11 Euros, while in the dictator game the average offer is 
of only 5 Euros3. 
 All these situations, although equivalent in terms of outcomes, are 
different if we consider the history of the play, particularly with respect 
not only to what each player did, but also to what they could have done 
                                                 
3 Blount (1995), Charness (1998), Nelson (2002) and Charness & Levine (2005) have 
found highlighted similar patterns of anomalous behaviour.  
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and did not. What emerges is that for real people bygones are as relevant 
as the choices actually made. Subjects seem to asses and react in different 
ways to the same material payoff distribution when this is brought about 
by different courses of actions, by different combinations of moves. This 
evidence sheds light on the differences that emerge when individuals act 
on the basis of information predicting others’, and when they act on the 
basis of information about mental causes of other individuals’ behaviour. 
The rationale behind this “anomalous” behaviour may be the fact that 
different combinations of actions, apart from the outcome they produce, 
signal different messages about the players’ intentions. When they try to 
read each other’s minds subjects infer others’ intentions by what they did 
as well as by what they could have done and did not. Bygones help us to 
read other players’ minds, to infer their intentions. To offer $8 in G1 
appears to be different from offering the same amount in G2, because in 
the former case A willingly avoids the 50-50 proposal which most of Bs 
consider fair. In G2, on the contrary, the alternative proposal implies a 
sacrifice for A, and therefore the $8-offer is accepted by Bs relatively 
more frequently.  
 
 
4 Intentionality and PGT.  
 
 Intentionality is a central concern in the philosophical theory of 
action and it has attracted growing attention in the fields of 
neurosciences, as well as experimental and developmental psychology. In 
philosophy, the word intentionality means something very specific, 
notably, the nature of the mental states, desires, beliefs, goals, and other 
“propositional stances”. Intentionality is the way our mind puts us in 
relation to the external world. According to Michael  Bratman (1989), an 
intention is a plan of action the subject chooses and commits itself to in 
pursuit of a goal. An intention, thus, includes both a means and a goal. 
The latter fact is important to explain why the same action performed 
with different goals may be assessed in different ways, as the 
experimental evidence from the previous section shows. Consider, for 
example, the different way people (and the law) react to a murder or a 
manslaughter. Different reactions to the same action because, although 
the same causal link between action and consequences persists, the same 
action has different ends. In the same way: “If considered intentional, a 
critical remark can be seen as a hurtful insult; a collision in the hallway as 
a dangerous provocation; and a charming smile as a hint of seduction. 
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But if considered unintentional, that same remark may be excused; the 
same collision may lead to a new friendship; and the same smile might 
simply indicate a good mood” (Malle & Knobe, 1997:101).  
 In the domain of strategic social interactions the role of intentions is 
crucial because, if we may come to know others’ intentions we will be 
able to express judgements and to predict their behaviour.  
 McCabe et al. (2000) investigated the extent to which cooperation is 
influenced by the representation form of the game and found that in an 
extensive form game, cooperation is achieved more often than in an 
equivalent game when represented by a normal form. Their explanation 
is based on the idea that the extensive form makes it easier to engage in 
the mind-reading process that allows players to infer others’ intentions 
from their moves: to read another person’s thoughts or intentions by 
placing themselves in the position and information state of the other 
person” (2000:4404). This mind-reading process, in turn, via reciprocity, 
tends to favor players’ coordination on cooperative outcomes. That is 
consistent with the finding according to which achieving cooperation in 
games with private information is harder that in games of complete 
information. The lack of information about others’ incentive structure 
makes it difficult to infer their intentions from what they chose to do. 
 Neurosciences have recently shown that the capacity to understand 
others’ action attaching to them specific goals is typical of superior 
primates and in particular of human beings (Rizzolatti, et al., 2001), 
possibly because of the existence of sophisticated linguistic abilities 
(Tommasello, 2000). By the age of 4, children can infer what people 
know, think or believe on the basis on what they say or do: this ability is 
known as “mind-reading” (McCabe et al., 2000:4404). Neurosciences 
provide different theories to explain how this process works, commonly 
referred to as theories of mind or ToM. These theories can be 
distinguished into two large families: the “theories of theory of mind”, 
also known as “theory-theory” (TT) and the so-called “simulation 
theories” (ST).  
 The former theory postulates that agents tend to explain and predict 
others’ behavior by means of a set of causal laws that form a sort of folk 
psychology (Carruthers & Smith, 1996).  According to TT, agents use 
simple explanatory laws to link the (unobservable) determinants of 
behavior (desires, beliefs and intentions) to external (observable) stimuli 
in order to predict people’s actions. This attributions process works on 
the basis of theoretical reasoning that involves (tacitly) shared causal 
laws. 
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 The second class of theories, simulation theories (Davis & Stone, 
1995), on the other hand, posit that the attribution of mental states to 
other people works through mental representation: agents are able to 
simulate the reasoning process, pretending to be, literally, in the “mental 
shoes” of the other agents whose behavior they are observing or want to 
predict. “First you create in yourself pretend desires and beliefs of the 
sort you take [the other] to have (...) these pretend preferences and 
beliefs are fed into your own decision-making mechanism, which outputs 
a (pretend) decision” (Gallese & Goldman, 1998:496). The basic 
difference between the two classes of theories is that while TT describes 
mind-reading as a neutral, objective and detached theoretical process, ST 
considers it as a matter of actual replication of the same neural activities 
implied in the action the subject is trying to interpret or predict. 
According to ST, thus, social cognition is not only reasoning about 
others’ mental states, it is more like experiential insight of other minds. 
Gallese & Goldman (1998) and following studies report evidence 
describing exactly this matching of mental activity between two subjects, 
an agent and an observer, they define as “mental mimicry”. This 
mechanism involves a class of neurons, the so-called “mirror neurons” 
that have the intriguing property of firing both when the subject 
performs a certain action as well as when she observes someone else 
doing the same action. Mental mimicry thus can be qualified not only as 
a theoretical activity, since the mirror neurons re-create in the observer 
the same mental activity that is ongoing in the brain of the observed. In 
interpreting the role of the mirror-neurons system, Gallese & Goldman 
suggest that it may provide the neurophysiologic basis underlying human 
beings’ ability to represent others’ intentions by the observation of their 
actions.  
 Having briefly illustrated the role of intentions in the process of 
social cognition and how the ability to attach intentions to others’ 
actions may facilitate interpersonal coordination, it is necessary to 
explore how such an ability can be formalized in the context of abstract 
games. What I shall try to show in this part of the paper is that PGT 
provides useful formal tools to do exactly this in a way which is 
consistent with the conceptual framework of the  ST and their neural 
correlates. Traditional game theory assumes that payoffs depend only on 
the actions chosen by each player. Whatever motivates players’ actions can 
be summarised by payoffs attached to the outcomes of the game. The 
players’ preference ordering over those outcomes is represented by their 
payoff vector. While this framework has gained considerable success in 
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many areas within and outside economics, at the same time it has 
demonstrated as being too narrow to account for many social phenomena, 
especially those characterised by the presence of belief-dependent 
motivations. A variety of social emotions, as well as social norms such as 
trust and reciprocity, cannot be properly formalised in the classical theory in 
which payoffs are taken as exogenous. PGT develops tools that allow the 
formal analysis of many of those phenomena, making more manageable the 
natural but impractical way of modelling hierarchies of beliefs, referred to 
by Harsany. To understand how, consider a general utility function for 
psychological games (Battigalli & Dufwemberg, 2005): 
 ∏∏
∈∈
ℜ→×Μ×
Nj
j
Nj
ji SZu :  
 
where Z represents the set of terminal nodes, N is the set of players, Mj is 
the set of j’s of possible conditional beliefs about others’ strategies and 
conditional beliefs, and Sj is the set of j’s pure strategies. Strategies and 
beliefs are conditional to every history of play (see Battigalli & Siniscalchi, 
1999). Thus, in a psychological game players’ utility depends on their 
strategies and their (higher order) beliefs about their strategies. 
Geneakoplos, Pearce & Stacchetti (1989) originally developed various 
solution concepts for psychological games. In a psychological game each 
player considers each single action within the entire set of actions 
available at each node. In this way it is possible to infer other players’ 
intentions by counterfactually thinking about what they could have done 
and did not. A (psychological) equilibrium is obtained when both players 
maximise their payoffs and the hierarchies of beliefs are confirmed. 
Dufwenberg & Battigalli (2005), generalising Geneakoplos, Pearce & 
Stacchetti’s model, extend this framework even further: 
i) allowing beliefs being revised as the game unfolds; 
ii) defining a psychological sequential equilibrium, in the line of 
Kreps & Wilson (1982);  
iii) considering non-equilibrium analysis in the line of 
rationalizability (Bernheim, 1984; Pearce, 1984).  
 
In recent years, few theoretical models applying PGT (Rabin, 1993; 
Dufwenberg & Kirchsteiger, 1998; Falk & Fischbacher, 2006) have been 
proposed to explain deviations from selfish behavior on the basis of 
players’ different assessments and their reaction about the negative or 
positive intentions of other players, as signalled by their choices, together 
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with their bygones. Other hybrid models (Levine, 1998; Falk & 
Fischbacher, 1998; Charness & Rabin, 1999) combine the role of 
intentions with that of distributional concerns.  
 Summarizing PGT allows to model agents able to attribute intentions 
to others’ actions by observing others’ chosen actions and their results 
together with their un-chosen options. This process appears to be surprisingly 
similar to that described by ST, and it can formally be described and 
analyzed by PGT. It is important to notice, however, that while the latter 
considers the process as a deliberate and volitional act, ST posits that 
simulation occurs automatically and unconsciously. This, however, does not 
reduce the usefulness of the formal description of the mental process 
enabling us to interpret others’ intentions and goals.  
 
 
5 The trust problem  
  
 Consider now the second problematic issue: the problem of trust 
and that related of payoff endogenization. It is worth noticing that in the 
most advanced formalization of PGT, Battigalli & Dufwenberg’s theory 
of dynamic psychological games (2005), 6 out of 9 examples are 
presented using games of trust. A fiduciary interaction is characterized by 
three basic elements: i) potential negative consequences; ii) risk of 
opportunism; iii) lack of control. All these elements are summarised in the 
so-called “basic trust game” (G3): point i)  is described by b<a; point  ii) 
depends on being e>f; point iii) is obtained modelling the game as a non-
cooperative, two-stage sequential game. 
 
G3: The Simple Trust Game 
 
    Player A 
 
   L            R 
    
                Player B 
 
               L           R 
    
     
    a b         c 
    d e                f    
b<a<c; f<e;  
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In the trust game, A chooses first either L or R; in choosing L, players 
get a payoffs pair equal to (a,d). But if A chooses R, the choice passes to 
B, who, in turn, can choose either L or R. In the first case, she gets e and 
A gets b; in the second case B gets f and A gets c. Given such a payoff 
matrix and the relations between its elements, the game theoretical 
advice for a rational course of action will be for A to choose L and stop 
the game there. Although in this game A’s preferred outcome would be 
that described by (c,f), such a situation is not an equilibrium outcome 
and, in fact, it is achievable only when both player A deviates from her 
individually rational course of action choosing R, and player B renounces 
her rational strategy by opting for R. However, as robust experimental 
results show4, a significant number of As prefers to play R and a 
significant number of Bs resists the temptation of the opportunistic 
choice by playing R. Several different strategies have been followed to 
account for these data: heterodox theoretical models based on behavioral 
principles such as altruism, inequity aversion, or other, more radical 
moves, such as Ken Binmore’s (1998) that suggests to rationalize the 
anomalies by considering payoffs as utility measures appear in the 
revealed preference theory, that is, ex-post indexes of preferences and 
simply re-describing the game to make it consistent with people’s choice.  
 In G4, from the original payoff matrix, other matrixes are obtained 
by processing the objective payoffs by means of the above-mentioned 
principles. However, all these explanations present important 
limitations (Pelligra, 2005a). Two of the emerging alternative theories are 
based on reciprocity (Rabin, 1993) and on trust responsiveness (Pelligra, 
2005b). 
 
                                                 
4 See Camerer (2003) for a review. 
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G4: “Trust Game re-described” 
 
         Player A 
 
                   L           R 
    
 
                              Player B 
 
                         L          R   
 
Objective Payoffs              1                   -1             2 
      1     3   2 
      --------------------------------------- 
B altruist      1        -1   2       
αB= 0.5 
                  1.5       2.5    3  
      --------------------------------------- 
B inequity averse     1        -1  2    
βB = 0.5 
                               1       1  2  
      --------------------------------------- 
Tautologism    1      -1  4 
                              1      3   4  
 
 
 All these theories consider an extended utility function that 
incorporates objective payoffs and transforms them according to some 
behavioral principle, which may render the trustful and trustworthy 
combination of choices an equilibrium of the trust game. For altruists B’s 
utility depends on B’s payoff plus A’s payoff weighted by some 
parameter αB, ranging between 0 and 1 (Margolis, 1982). Inequity averse 
Bs aim both at maximizing their own objective payoff and minimizing 
the difference between B’s and A’s payoffs (Fehr & Schmidt, 1999). The 
negative impact of inequality is weighted by different parameters, αB and 
βB (with αB > βB) when B occupies, respectively, the disadvantageous or 
the advantageous side of the distribution. 
 According to Rabin, (positive) reciprocity is the act of conferring 
benefits on people who have previously materially benefited you, while 
trust responsiveness is the act of conferring benefits on people who have 
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shown that they expect you to do so, and have willingly exposed 
themselves to harm in the event you act on material self-interest. So trust 
responsiveness assumes that an explicit act of trust may “induce” or 
“elicit”, to some degree, a trustworthy response. In this respect, trust is 
said to be responsive or self-fulfilling. While reciprocity is based on the joint 
action of both material and psychological incentives, trust responsiveness is 
exclusively based on a psychological-moral motivation. 
 Several experiments (Dufwenberg & Gneezy, 1998; Bacharach et al., 
2005; Pelligra, 2005b)  show that when you rule out the effect of altruism, 
inequity aversion, but also reciprocity, some instances of trustful and 
trustworthy behavior are still to be explained. From these tests, trust 
responsiveness seems to emerge as the most basic explanation for trust. 
However, apart from the differences in the descriptive power, altruism, 
inequity aversion and trust responsiveness differ also on more substantial 
grounds. While the former two, in fact, are theories of forward looking 
behavior, that consider intentions that players attribute to one another as 
irrelevant, the latter, on the contrary, is a theory of backward looking 
behavior. That means that in altruism and inequity-aversion based theories 
the payoff transformation is exogenous, that is external to the game, trust 
responsiveness implies an endogenous payoff transformation. You need 
endogenous payoffs when you want to model situations where the 
relational aspect is important, where the very fact of entering a relation, an 
interaction, affect players’ prior preferences. Such relational factors can be 
formalized using psychological game theory. Consider now, as an 
illustration, the following variant of the Simple Trust Game (G5).  
 
 
G5: “The Simple Trust Game with endogenous Guilt” 
 
                     
    Player A 
 
    L           R 
    
              Player A 
 
             1-p        p     
      
     a            b                   c 
              d                e − Gr              f   
c>a>b ; e>f ; G>0;     
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Denote with p ∈ [0,1] the probability that B plays R; 1-p is the 
probability with which B plays L. In the same way q ∈ [0,1]  represents 
A’s belief about p. Analogously, r denotes B’s belief about q, that is, B’s 
belief about A’s beliefs about B’s choice. In this way we describe B’s 
hierarchy of beliefs, in particular, his first and second order beliefs. These 
beliefs are crucial to transform the standard game into a psychological 
one. I will restrict my formal discussion to the usual equilibrium analysis 
leaving aside considerations of out-of-equilibrium behavior.  
Suppose B observes A’s trustful choice (A plays R); we are now in 
the second node of the game, where B has to move. In this version of 
the trust game, B’s payoff from being opportunist is made up by a 
material part and a psychological one, which in turn depends on a “guilt 
factor”. The negative impact of guilt on B’s overall utility is a multiple G 
(G>0) of A’s expectation r. The intuition underlying such a formalization 
is that B suffers a psychological loss when he deliberately lets A down 
knowing that A has trusted him, and such loss is proportional to B’s 
belief about A’s expectation of B’s trustworthy behavior.  
We can solve the game by isolating its psychological equilibria. In a 
psychological equilibrium players maximize their utility, and their first 
and second order believes are confirmed (p=q=r). This particular game 
shows three of such equilibria: 
 
1) in the first, A expects B to play trustworthily; given this, B’s 
psychological cost from frustrating A’s expectation becomes 
strong enough to lead B to the expected, trustworthy choice. 
A knows that and sets q accordingly (q=1): she plays R; B 
knows that as well, and sets r=q=1: he plays R. In the first 
equilibrium A plays R and p=q=r=1, that is, B plays R. Trust 
is self-fulfilling; 
2) in the second equilibrium, A expects B playing 
opportunistically, that choice would not produce any 
psychological cost for B. B knows that and sets q=0; 
consequently B sets r=q=0. In the second equilibrium A plays 
L and p=q=r=0, that is, B plays L;   
3) the third (mixed-strategy) equilibrium is obtained by setting 
B’s payoff from opportunism and from trustworthiness equal, 
and imposing p=r. In this third equilibrium, which only exists 
if pc+(1-p)b>a, it follows that A plays R provided that 
p=q=r=(e-f)/G and 0<(e-f)/G<1. The associated payoffs are 
pc+(1-p)b for A and (1-p)(e -rG)+pf for B. 
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 In this third case, both trustworthiness and opportunism may follow 
A’s trustful move, depending on the players’ beliefs. The denominator G 
in (2) represents the impact of social sentiments, or internal reasons, on 
B’s utility. This factor, as well as the difference (e-f), directly affects the 
probability of B’s trustworthy behavior.  
 One important feature of this analysis is that the Simple Trust 
Game, once re-described as a psychological game, becomes a 
coordination game5. Which equilibrium will be selected depends, in fact, 
on the way players coordinate their first and second order expectations. 
In the pure strategy equilibria, if A expects B to behave trustworthily and 
such expectation is known also to B, the latter will be then induced to 
trustworthiness; both players coordinate on r=q=1. On the contrary, if A 
believes B to be an opportunist, this reduces B’s psychological cost of 
opportunism leading her to behave exactly as A expected. Coordination 
takes place on r=q=0  
 Once recognized that behavioral coordination depends on the 
players’ first and second order beliefs,  we are induced to investigate the 
existence of equilibrium selection devices. In other words, what favors or 
hinders beliefs coordination This question leads us directly to the third 
problem of our original list, the problem of framing.  
 
                                                 
5 Camerer and Thaler (2003) provide a similar interpretation.  
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 6 Social Framing Effects 
 
 Most of the work done on the role of framing in decision-making 
focuses on individual choices while neglecting strategic environments 
almost completely. However, if we consider Kahneman and Tversky’s 
originally definition of the framing process as “controlled by the manner 
in which the choice problem is presented as well as by norms, habits and 
expectancies of the decision maker” (1987:257), its importance to the 
understanding of interactive decision and thus, for traditional and 
psychological game theory, clearly emerges) 
Coordination games as well as all the situations where the role of players’ 
expectations is explicitly taken into account determine the problem of 
multiplicity of equilibria. While on the one hand empirical evidence 
shows that real people are remarkably capable to coordinate over the 
optimal outcomes using theoretically non-relevant information  (see 
Metha, Starmer & Sugden, 1994), on the other, since the pioneering 
contribution of Thomas Schelling (1969), and apart from a few 
exceptions (Metha et al., 1995; Bacharach & Sthal, 2000; Janssen, 2001; 
Bacharach, 2006), theorists have been unable to provide a satisfactory 
explanation of such an ability. Focal points theories aims at 
understanding the process through which players connect their strategies 
with the context of the game using the informational richness of the 
latter to find in the environment clues useful to coordinate their choices. 
Here is the connection between the coordination problem and the 
framing problem. Different frames may, in fact, favor or hinder the 
reading of such information. In psychological games, coordination is 
even more problematic because an equilibrium requires not only 
behavioral consistency, but also first and second order beliefs’ 
compatibility. This fact has convinced Battigalli and Dufwenberg that 
“assuming equilibrium may be assuming too much especially in 
psychological games” (p. 11). If the latter may be true in theory, on the 
empirical side, the kind of multiplicity of equilibria implied in 
psychological games may constitute an element of realism, precisely 
because it leaves room for the working of frames as beliefs and strategies 
correlating device.  
 In the context of the psychological trust game, we have already 
observed how the perception we have about the idea the others have of 
us may influence our decision to be trustworthy or opportunist. Such 
perception develops and strengthens in relation to others’ actions, and 
particularly in relation to our interpretation of such actions. Such 
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interpretation, in turn, is strongly affected by the context and the frame 
within which actions take place. In particular, context and frame are 
crucial to norm-guided behavior, which is essentially collective and 
strategic as it is related to our expectations about others’ behavior and 
others’ expectations about our own behavior. This is not surprisingly 
consistent with evidence reported by McCabe et al. (1998) on the role of 
game forms in facilitating mind-reading, and therefore coordination 
towards cooperative outcome.  
 In strategic contexts the (social) framing effects precisely describes 
how the same action may provoke different reactions depending on the 
context where it happens, because the context, in turn, affect players’ 
expectations about others’ choices and expectations.   
 This interpretation of equilibrium indeterminacy, as related to the 
role of framing, may also help to explain a well-established regularity in 
experimental games: the finding according to which people who expect 
others to cooperate are more willing to cooperate themselves. That fact, 
which is hard to reconcile with existing models, is a consequence of the 
coordinating process at work in psychological games. In the same vein, 
Ross and Ward (1996) and Blair and Stout (2000) report of experiments 
where subjects’ behavior in exactly the same situation is modified by 
non-theoretically relevant elements, such as, for instance, the semantic 
description of the situation itself. In a social dilemma, labeled as 
“community game”, the number of cooperative choices turns out to be 
much larger that in the same game when labeled as “wall street game”. 
The framing of the situation in this context, as well as pre-play 
communication in others, helps players to coordinate their first and 
second order beliefs. It is the framing of the situation that alters the 
players’ belief about others’ expected behavior and about their 
expectations on each other’s behavior.  
 
 
7 Conclusions 
 
 The main thesis I wanted to put forward is that, thanks to the 
epistemic consequences of the hierarchy of beliefs formalised in PGT, 
we became capable to address, and to some extent, solve three of the 
most theoretically and empirically relevant problems that affect classical 
game theory.  
 First: intentions are important to players to ascribe meaning to 
actions, as the evidence reviewed in section 3 shows; it is equally 
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important to theorists to understand why different reactions may 
originate from the same action. Simulation theories postulated that this 
intentions attribution process works through mental mimicry, that is, by 
activating the same neuronal circuits that are active in the brain of the 
subject who actually performs the action. PGT allows to formalise this 
process by enabling theorists to manage an entire hierarchy of beliefs, as 
well as the counterfactual reasoning implied in the “mind-reading” 
activity.  
 Second: trust is a relational construct. My claim is that it can be 
better understood if we assume that trustfulness may elicit 
trustworthiness, a mechanism that has been dubbed “trust 
responsiveness”(Pelligra 2005a, 2005b). Such responsiveness implies that 
payoffs cannot be taken from outside the game. PGS provides a method 
to endogenize such payoffs and to analyse, in this way, belief-dependent 
emotions, such as pride and guilt, that are supposed to play a major role 
in explaining trustful and trustworthy behaviour.  
 Third: psychological equilibria are affected by a problem of (higher 
order) belief coordination. This fact makes the presence of a 
coordinating device necessary. While in general multiplicity of equilibria 
is viewed as problematic, I maintain that in this case it introduces an 
element of realism, as it leaves room for the working of decision (social) 
frames that facilitate the coordination of players’ beliefs towards a 
unique equilibrium.  
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